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TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED BY THE
1964 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA*
11. BRICE GRAvEs
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia
,Member of the firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell and Gibson
The 1964 General Assembly enacted tax legislation affecting the tax
on capital, granting general enabling legislation relating to local license
taxes, and providing new rules in the corporation-stockholder relations
area. These are the more important subjects covered by the 1964 legis-
lation, and the discussion contained in this article will be limited to
them. Other less important legislative changes will be summarized at
the end of the article.
THE TAX ON CAPITAL
Capital is defined' as intangible personal property. For many years,2
Virginia has levied a tax on the capital of manufacturing enterprises and
others but particularly manufacturers. The definition of capital before
the 1964 amendment included money on hand and on deposit, the excess
of receivables over payables and inventories and then a general category
including bonds, notes, choses in action and personal property tangible
in fact used in the business.s
The tax on capital is an intangible property tax, but it is measured
in part by tangible property. The 1964 legislation eliminated money
from the base of the tax on capital beginning January 1, 1965.' This is
rather strange on first impression because money would seem to be the
best example of the capital of any business, but the reason for the
elimination was that the Virginia banks, and particularly the Virginia
Bankers Association, were able to convince the General Assembly that
many of the larger national corporations that normally kept a sub-
stantial amount of money on deposit in Virginia banks generally re-
moved those deposits out of the Virginia banks and shipped them to
New York in December in order to eliminate the money from the base
of the tax on capital on the assessment date, which is January 1. Follow-
ing such removal it would not be until the following February that the
money could come back without running afoul of another Virginia
*This section of the Tax Conference Record has been included in the William
and Mary Law Review, Vol. 6, beginning at page 203, as a convenience to
readers of this Review.
1. VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-410.
2. SEE AcTs, 1918, p. 171.
3. VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-411.
4. ACTS, 1964, ch. 423.
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statute5 which provides that if intangible property, within thirty days
before January 1, is converted into non-taxable property such as Gov-
ernment bonds or is sent out of the State and then is brought back into
the State within 30 days after January 1, this shall be prima facie
evidence of an attempt to defraud the State of the tax and the tax will
nevertheless apply unless the taxpayer can prove the absence of an at-
tempt to defeat the tax.
Effective on January 1, 1965, tangible personal property other than
inventory is eliminated from the base of the tax on capital and will be
subject to local taxation. That provision does not apply to manufacturers
and the mining industry.6 All tangible personal property of manufac-
turers and miners, including not only inventory but also other property
such as office furniture and fixtures and automobiles, continues to be a
part of the base of the tax on capital and therefore excludible from local
taxation.' As to other business enterprises, however, only inventories,
in the category of property tangible in fact, will be included in the base
of the tax on capital after 1964.
Effective January 1, 1966, agricultural products held for processing
and which are of such a nature as to customarily require storage and
processing for periods of more than one year, shall be includible in
inventory and thereby subjected to the tax on capital for one year only.8
This provision was added in order to limit the tax on capital measured
by tobacco products that are held for ageing. Since normally tobacco
products are held in inventory for several years, the provision to tax
those products only once is designed to make Virginia more competi-
tive with neighboring States and encourage the growth of the tobacco
industry here. It may be noted in passing that distillers have the same
problem, but they were not given this relief from taxation of the same
personal property more than once.
Finally, beginning in 1967,' the rate of the tax on capital will be
scaled down over a four-year period from the present rate of 65 cents
per $100 to 50 cents per $100.
The only real justification for the tax on capital is that it eliminates
the inventories of manufacturers from local taxation and makes such
inventories subject to a uniform State rate of tax. This is because, as
we have seen, capital is classified as intangible property not subject to local
taxation. 10 The tax, however, is not a popular one, and there is sub-
5. VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-421.
6. ACTS, 1964, ch. 423.
7. VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-405.
8. ACTS, 1964, ch. 423.
9. ACTS, 1964, ch. 430.
10. See CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA § 171, VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-411.
TAX CONFERENCE
stantial sentiment that if retained the rate should be reduced to a more
or less nominal amount. 11
LICENSE TAXES
License or privilege taxes are levied on specified businesses, trades and
professions on both the State and local levels. The 1964 legislation in
this area consisted of an enabling act 12 clarifying and broadening the
power of counties to raise revenue from this source.
Before the 1964 amendment, cities and towns were given general au-
thority to levy license taxes on any business privilege taxed by the State.' 3
Now, of course, cities have other sources of taxing power, namely their
charters, and most cities, even before the 1964 amendment, were thought
to have the power to levy license taxes on business privileges even though
not taxed by the State, including sales and use taxes. The reason for that
conclusion is the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
in the case of Fallon Florist v. City of Roanoke.' 4 In that case, Roanoke
had passed an ordinance levying a sales tax on three types of transactions,
sales by florists, sales of cigarettes and hotel room rentals. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia pointed out that the charter of the city gave
the Council the power to levy taxes deemed necessary for the govern-
mental purposes of the city. The Court then said:
Clearly, this language was designed to confer upon the city the
general power of taxation-that is, the power to levy and impose
such taxes as the legislative body of the city may deem necessary
for its governmental functions-except only as that power is limited
by the Constitution and laws of this State and of the United States.1 5
The Court further decided that there were no such limitations on the
power of the city to levy the selected sales taxes there involved.
Since most other cities have charter provisions similar to those of Roa-
noke, we may conclude that cities generally had the power to levy sales
taxes and license taxes on privileges not taxed by the State even before
the 1964 legislation. Counties, on the other hand, had no similar author-
ity, in fact counties generally had no license tax authority at all. There
were two statutes dealing with only a limited number of counties. Section
11. See Recommendation IX, Opportunities for the Improvement of Virginia's
Tax Structure (Virginia State Chamber of Commerce, Richmond, Virginia, 1962).
12. ACTS, 1964, ch. 424.
13. VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-266.1, before the 1964 amendment.
14. 190 Va. 564, 58 S.E. 2d 316 (1950). The result here was forecast by the
case of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Co., 95 Va. 564, 567, 28 S.E. 959 (1898),
where the Court explained similar language in the city's charter as follows: "This
language has been construed by this court and held to confer the general power
of taxation, except only as it may be limited by the laws of the State, or of the
United States, and to include all powers and subjects of taxation."
15. Supra 577.
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58-266.2 gave certain countiesi 5a the right to impose business license
taxes, with specified exceptions, whether or not such privileges had been
subjected to State taxation, and Section 58-266.3 gave certain other
counties' the right to impose business license taxes, again with specified
exceptions, when anything for which a license is required by the State
is to be done within the county. Other counties had no such taxing
authority.
Now the 1964 legislation,' 7 which provides a general statute applicable
to all counties as well as all cities and towns, enables those local govern-
mental bodies to levy business license taxes whether or not the privilege
is taxed by the State. The principal purpose of this legislation, certainly
the purpose that the Legislature had in mind, was to give counties
general license taxing authority and particularly the authority to tax
retail and wholesale merchants.
One of the possible results of that broad grant of license tax authority,
however, is that counties now might have the right to levy general
sales taxes if the sales tax is imposed as a privilege tax on the retailer
or vendor. That possibility undoubtedly was not in the mind of the
General Assembly when it passed the legislation, but it is generally
thought now, after the 1964 legislation, that counties have the power to
levy sales taxes if imposed as a privilege tax.
Although it seems probable that counties now have the right after the
1964 legislation to impose sales taxes, counties very well might not be
inclined to impose such taxes because they do not have the power to
impose use taxes on purchases by residents outside the county for
consumption, storage or distribution within the county. Counties, as
distinguished from cities, do not have the power to impose use taxes
because such a tax is not the type of property tax contemplated by gen-
eral law (it is, in fact, an excise tax on the consumer), and the licensing
authority that was granted by the 1964 legislation is the power to impose
license taxes on a business or business privilege.
It should be noted here that a license form of sales tax would not
prevent the purchaser or consumer from deducting the sales tax for
Federal income tax purposes if the tax in fact is passed on and is
15a. These counties were Elizabeth City (Acts, 1948, ch. 150), Arlington and
Pittsylvania (Acts, 1960, ch. 554) and Roanoke (Acts, 1960, ch. 554).
16. Arlington, Henrico and Warwick (Acts, 1948, ch. 105), Chesterfield (Acts,
1950, ch. 64), Elizabeth City and Fairfax (Acts, 1952, chs. 38 and 460), Chester-
field (Acts 1956, ch. 449), and Chesterfield (Acts, 1962, ch. 486).
17. ACTS, 1964, ch. 424. Section 58-266.1 now reads: "The council of any
city or town, and the governing body of any county, may levy and provide for
the assessment and collection of city, town or county license taxes on businesses,
trades, professions, occupations and callings and upon the persons, firms and
corporations engaged therein within the city, town or county, whether any license
tax be imposed thereon by the State or not * * *" subject to specified limitations.
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separately stated."8 The fact that such taxes are normally passed on
has led some observers to suggest that the incidence of the tax is in fact
on the purchaser and therefore counties have no power to tax (as in the
case of the use tax above), but this view does not give proper apprecia-
tion to the difference between the economic incidence (here, on the
purchaser) and the legal incidence (here, on the businessman) of such
a sales tax.
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS
Almost everyone agrees that it is desirable for the Virginia income
tax law to conform with the Federal income tax law, particularly with
respect to business transactions, unless there are important policy reasons
for having a different State rule. The Department of Taxation attempts
to achieve this uniformity when it can properly do so, but when the
Federal rule is provided by a specific and detailed statutory provision
the Department of Taxation often-and quite properly--refuses to
apply the Federal rule in Virginia without a similar statutory enactment.
It is gratifying that the 1964 General Assembly acted on three subjects
in the corporate-stockholder relations area with the result that there will
be more uniformity of State and Federal income taxation than existed
before.
Transfers of property to a controlled corporation solely in exchange
for stock or securities long have been free from the recognition of gain
or loss for Federal income tax purposes." A somewhat similar statutory
provision 0 was adopted for Virginia in 1964, but with many latent
differences:
(a) The Virginia legislation provides for the nonrecognition of gain
or loss only if the transfer is to a newly organized corporation. This
will allow the tax-free incorporation of a proprietorship or partnership,
and that was the primary purpose of the legislation. Two possibilities
might be considered for the tax-free acquisition of property by a
previously existing corporation. The first is a contribution to capital
without the issuance of additional stock. The second is the transfer of the
property to a new corporation for its stock, followed by a merger of
the new corporation into the previously existing corporation.
(b) The Virginia statute applies only to transfers by individuals. 21
(c) Whereas the Federal rule applies to transfers for stock or "securi-
ties" the Virginia rule is limited to transfers solely for stock. Also,
18. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 164(b) (5). This is true only
for purchases not connected with a trade or business, but purchases of this latter
type can generally be expensed or depreciated.
19. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 351.
20. ACTS, 1964, ch. 369, adding § 58-86.1-3.
21. This difference is more apparent than real since the State Tax Commissioner
previously has ruled that a transfer of property by a corporation to a newly
formed wholly-owned subsidiary does not give rise to the recognition of gain or loss.
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there is no limited tax treatment similar to that for "boot" exchanges
under Federal law, but this is only consistent with the restriction of the
Virginia rule to new incorporations where "boot" exchanges are seldom
encountered or can be easily accomplished by a pre-incorporation sale
between the transferors.
(d) The Virginia statute does not contain any limitation on the
amount of indebtedness to which the transferred assets may be subject.22
(e) There is no specific provision in the Virginia law that the basis
of stock received in a § 58-86.1:3 transaction must be reduced by
indebtedness assumed by the corporation.2 3
(f) The Virginia statute specifically provides that it does not apply
to transfers to mutual funds. 24
From the foregoing outline of differences between the Federal and
the Virginia rules relating to the tax consequences of transfers to con-
trolled corporations it might appear at first that significant tax differences
will result. With the possible exception of the use of securities, as dis-
tinguished from stock, in the exchange, that conclusion seems improb-
able. The existence of the Federal rule should eliminate at least most
of the possible problems relating to the assumption of indebtedness,
and the downward adjustment of basis by the amount of the assumed
liabilities might well be within the administrative authority of the De-
partment of Taxation.
The second subject in the corporate-stockholder relationship area is
the nonrecognition of gain or loss upon the liquidation of a controlled
corporation.25  Before the 1964 legislaton 26 the Virginia rules really
amounted to a tax trap, for a parent corporation could acquire all the
assets and liabilities of a subsidiary corporation without the recognition
of gain if the advisors of the parent knew how to go about it. The old
technique was to merge the subsidiary into the parent, and if the trans-
action constituted a statutory merger it was clear that gain was not
recognized to either the parent or to the subsidiary. On the other hand,
if the subsidiary were liquidated into the parent without taking the
relatively insignificant step to qualify the transaction as a merger, Vir-
ginia imposed the income tax on any gain realized by the parent.
22. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 357(c), relating to
the transfer of property subject to a liability in excess of basis.
23. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 358(d).
24. This is an illustration of the influence of the ruling policy of the INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE. See T.I.R. No. 303 (February 9, 1961), as amended by
T.I.R. No. I I(March 3, 1961). The reason for the VIRGINIA rule appears to be
the fear that if a taxfree exchange results in the achievement of a diversification of
investments, the owner will retain the mutual fund shares until he dies, thus ob-
taining for his beneficiaries a stepped-up basis and a consequent loss of income tax
revenues to the State.
25. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 332.
26. ACTS, 1964, ch. 280, adding § 58-86.1:2.
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The 1964 legislation conforms the Virginia law to the Federal law
and no longer requires that the liquidation of a controlled subsidiary
must be accomplished by way of a merger to prevent the recognition
of gain to the parent. There is, however, one omission from the Vir-
ginia statute that is found in a related Federal statute. The Federal
statute 27 provides that, if a subsidiary corporation is liquidated within
two years after the parent acquired the stock,28 the basis of the proper-
ties in the hands of the parent after the liquidation will be the cost of the
stock rather than the old basis in the hands of the subsidiary.
Again, the forgoing difference in the statutory provisions probably
is of minor practical importance because the Department of Taxation
and the Virginia courts have Federal tax law precedent to achieve sub-
stantially the same result should they desire to do so. In the Kimball-
Diamond Milling Company2 9 case, the court held that if stock is
purchased with the intention of liquidating the corporation in order to
acquire direct ownership of the underlying assets, the basis of the assets
received in the liquidation is the cost of the stock. The rule of the present
Federal statute has the advantage of a fixed time limit-2 years-for ap-
plication of the principle, but this does not change the principle if the
appropriate intention can be shown.
Another 1964 legislative enactment in the corporate-stockholder re-
lationship area was a statute 0 providing that no gain or loss is recognized
if common stock of a corporation is exchanged solely for common stock
of the same corporation or if preferred stock of a corporation is ex-
changed solely for preferred stock of the same corporation.
We should note that the statute applies only to an exchange of com-
mon for common or preferred for preferred of the same corporation.
It would apply, for example, in the case of an exchange of voting com-
mon for nonvoting common or to an exchange of one series of preferred
for another. This statute does not apply to an exchange of preferred
stock for common stock, or vice-versa, even of the same corporation,
but such an exchange nevertheless well might qualify for tax-free treat-
ment as an exchange pursuant to a plan of reorganization, i.e., a recapi-
talization."1
Finally, legislation8 2 was adopted in 1964 that is similar to the Federal
statute3 3 relating to distributions of stock pursuant to an anti-trust order
27. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 334(b) (2).
28. The stock must have been acquired in a taxable transaction, i.e., by purchase.
29. Commissioner v. Kimball-Diamond Milling Co., 187 F. 2d 718 (5th Cir.
1951), affirming 14 T.C. 74 (1950).
30. ACTS, 1964, ch. 529, adding § 58-86.1:4. This is identical with INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 1036.
31. See VA. CODE ANN. (1950), § 58-86.
32. ACTS, 1964, ch. 53, adding § 58-85.3.
33. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 1111.
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of a court. The new Virginia rule, effective with respect to distribu-
tions after December 31, 1963, is that a distribution of divested stock
shall not be deemed to be a dividend, but the fair market value of the
divested stock shall be applied against and reduce the basis of the stock
with respect to which the distribution was made. Any excess of value
over basis will be treated as gain.
Thus, beginning in 1964, distributions of General Motors stock by
DuPont will be treated first as reducing the basis of the DuPont stock.
To this point the Federal rule and the Virginia rule produce the same
result. After the recovery of basis, additional values received are taxed
for Federal purposes at the favored capital gains rate. Since there is no
distinction in Virginia between the rate of tax applying to capital gain
and to ordinary income, the tax advantage of the new legislation under
Virginia law ceases after the recovery of the basis of the stock with
respect to which the distribution of the divested stock is made.
MISCELLANEOUS TAX ENACTMENTS
Other tax legislation by the 1964 General Assembly includes a pro-
vision for tax deeds upon the sale of real estate of a corporation the
charter of which has been cancelled, 4 the addition of special provisions
for a bulk importer under the motor fuel tax3 5 and the payment of the
tax by mail,3 6 the revision of the tax on bank stock to exempt stock held
by bank holding companies to the extent that the stock of the bank
holding company is held by insurance companies and charities,37 a
change in the gift tax filing and payment dates to May 138 to conform
with the present income tax requirements, the allowance of a child
placed for adoption to be claimed as a dependent for income tax pur-
poses,3 9 an exemption from the requirement of filing Virginia income
tax returns by certain nonresidents who commute to work in Virginia
and are subject to income tax by their states of residence,40 a limitation
on the income tax credit for taxes paid by a resident to a state of non-
residence to a ratio of net income,4 1 an exemption from the recording
tax for any deed arising out of a contract to purchase real estate to the
34. ACTS, 1964, ch. 399, adding § 58-1053.1.
35. ACTS, 1964, ch. 180, adding § 58-687(5a).
36. ACTS, 1964, ch. 311, amending § 58-721.
37. ACTS, 1964, ch. 52, amending generally CHAPTER 10 of Title 58. The same
rule always has applied to bank stock held directly by insurance companies and
charities.
38. ACTS, 1964, ch. 392, amending §§ 58-223 and 58-238.
39. ACTS, 1964, ch. 123, amending § 58-98. See INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954, SECTION 152(b) (2).
40. ACTS, 1964, ch. 454, adding § 58-104.1 on a reciprocal basis only.
41. ACTS, 1964, ch. 454, amending § 58-103.
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extent that the tax was paid when the contract was recorded 42 and an
increase in the State license tax on automobiles. 43
The General Assembly of Virginia succeeded once more in delaying
the enactment of a State general sales tax. Mounting pressure for the
enactment of such a tax is certain to continue, particularly in view of
the anticipated spread of such taxes on the part of the cities of the State.
42. ACTS, 1964, chs. 19 and 361, amending § 58-61.
43. ACTS, 1964, ch. 218, amending § 46.1-149.

